Toward A Formal Definition of Task Representation by Hackathorn, Richard D. & Fetter, Robert A.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 1981 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
1981






Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1981
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 1981 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Hackathorn, Richard D. and Fetter, Robert A., "Toward A Formal Definition of Task Representation" (1981). ICIS 1981 Proceedings. 3.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1981/3






This paper addresses the issue of how tasks within an organizational
context should be represented from the perspective of a single
decision maker. Based on a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981), this
paper presents a formal ism for task representation based on recent
work in the Knowledge Representation area. The formalism is
called Simple Associative Network (SAN). The implications of this
formalism result in the discussion of several issues, such as: (a) the
nature of task occurrence, (b) handling multiple task types of a task
occurrence, (c) means and goals as a specialization of task types,
and (d) control structures among task types.
INTRODUCTION human action" after Ackoff and Emery
(1972) and Newell and Simon (1972). A
In a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981), the distinction was made between "task repre-
argument was made that the concept of sentation" (i.e., a language for describing
task needed to be formalized as a basis for tasks) and "task description" (i.e., an actual
understanding how a decision process could description of a specific task). It is argued
be supported using computer technology. that decision support is the management of
A task was defined in this paper in a task descriptions.
general manner as "a unit of purposeful
The focus of this paper is to develop a
formalization of task representation
through the application of recent knowl-
edge representation research. This formal-
ization will deal with the ambiguity of
*The authors wish to express appreciation to decision processes within the organi-
the members of the Information Systems zational context and will show distinct
Doctoral Seminar at the University of levels of task abstractions. Finally, issues
Colorado, Boulder. Its members include: for contructing decision support tools wi 11
Paul Zeiger, Jean Bell, Tracy Hansen, and be discussed.
Dick Sowar. The advice and encourage-
ment of Peter Keen, Ralph Sprague, Benn
Konsynski, Joyce Elam, John Henderson, SUPPORT OF DECISION MAKING
and Roger Weissinger-Baylon is also
greatly appreciated. Finally, thanks once An important theme of the Decision Sup-
again to Marcia Bravard for making an port Systems (D55) literature is the
infinite series of revisions into a polished emphasis on "support" rather than
and readable manuscript. "replacement" or "automation" (Scott
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Morton, 1971; Gorry & Scott Morton, 1971; can be specified and, hence, the degree of
Keen & Scott Morton, 1976; Alter, 1975, determinism. Other authors have noted
1976,1979; Keen, 1980; and Sprague, 198Ia, that structuredness is a relative concept of
198 I b). The point is that technology should the observer. Different observers note dif-
be used to assist managerial decision mak- ferent degrees of structuredness for an
ing, rather than replace the human involve- activi ty depending on their understanding
ment. The tasks that engage managers of the activity and assumpti6ns about im-
within organizational settings are extreme- portance, etc. Stabel I (1974, 1977) even
ly complex and fundamentally ambiguous. states that the structuredness of an activ-
The specification of formal algorithms to ity is often an organizational policy deci-
accomplish these tasks is very difficult and sion, one based on payoffs to the organi-
probably inappropriate. Further, attempts zation balanced with cost of information
to apply technology to automate manage- processing.
rial tasks have often led to failure.
The motivation for "support" rather than
The literature of such fields as systems "automation" is based on the notion of
analysis, information requirements analysis ambiguity with which a manager must
(Teichroew, 1974a, 1974b), and more re- cope. This ambiguity causes a dynamic
cently office specification languages tension between the pressure to act coun-
(Cook, 1980; Ellis, 1979; Ellis & Nutt, 1980; terbalanced with the indecision of acting.
Hammer & Kunin, 1980; Tsichritzis, 1980; More precisely, the di lemma for a manager
Zisma, 1977; Nawojski & Konsynski, 1981) is the choice of feasible actions that will
deals with formalisms for describing ac- result in the occurrence of desired events,
tivities of both humans and computers. leading to a goal. An important function
The deficiency that this literature has is for decision support systems is to assist in
that it deals with the concept of "human resolving the dilemma of planning actions.
purpose" in a very shallow fashion. This paper addresses an aspect of that
dilemma, that of task formulation.
For the most part, human purpose is ac-
knowledged but then eliminated from these The next section will elaborate on the
formalisms. For most computer applica- notion of ambiguity in organizational ac-
tions, the purpose or functionality of that tivity.
application is specified at the beginnning
of the development process and may be
used at the end to evaluate the resulting AMBIGUITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL
application. Note that the assumptions ACTIVITY
about purpose are that: (1) the purpose is
static, specifiable, and valid; and (2) the Consider the following situation:
means of accomplishing that purpose can
be formulated. These assumptions consti- Imagine that you're either the ref-
tuted the essence of the terms "routiniza- eree, coach, player, or spectator at
tion," 11mechanization," and "automation." an unconventional soccer match:the field for the game is round;
In the DSS literature, there is a strong there are several goals scattered
reaction against the automation of infor- haphazardly around the circular fi-
mation processing related to managerial eld; people enter and leave the
activities that are "unstructured." The game whenever they want to; they
term "unstructured" comes from the re- can throw balls in whenever they
search of Simon and others ( 1969, 1976) to want; they can say "that's my goal"
indicate the degree to which an activity whenever the> want to, as many
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times as they want to, and for as comprise the crucial elements of the or-
many goals as they want to; the ganization or system. This decomposition
entire game takes place on a sloped allows the manager to handle the com-
field; and the game is played as if it plexity issues through modularity. An
makes sense (Weick, 1976, from a event that is coupled to another or other
private communication with James events is responsive to those events, yet
March). "still preserves its own identity and some
evidence of its physical or logical sepa-
The above quote of Karl Weick's captures rateness" (Weick, 1969). The notion of
the flavor of the decision situation that loose coupling is similar to self-contained
most managers find themselves in. This tasks as described in Galbraith (1973,
situation is in sharp contrast to traditional 1977).
organization theory that focuses upon: -
The degree of coupling between two events
• Explicit selection of goals, has been characterized on the basis of the
activity of the shared variables of the two
• Rational formulation of plans to events. The specification of events and
achieve those goals, couplings is not a one-shot activity, as both
events and couplings may appear and dis-• Efficient execution of the plans appear over time. Any theory of coupling
through division of labor, and must also take into account the nature and
intensity of the couplings, as these can
• Layers of authority relations and cause the creation and dissolution of
incentives to control the above. events and couplings.
As stated by Weick ( 1976), the problem Cohen, March, and Olsen ( 1972) describe
with traditional organization theory is the three general properties of organizations
following: "People in organizations find or decision situations:
themselves hard pressed either to find ac-
tual instances of those rational practices 1. Problematic Preferences. An or-or to find rationalized practices whose ganization is usually better de-
outcomes have been as beneficient as pre- scribed as a loose collection of
dicted, or to feel that those rational occa- ideas rather than as a coherent
sions explain much of what goes on within structure. An organization dis-
the organization." Further, Weick notes covers preferences more through
that parts of some organizations are heav- actions than acting on the basis of
ily rationalized, yet the large, remaining preferences. It is therefore diffi-
section has consistently avoided rational cult to impute a set of preferences
analysis. One wonders how such incon- to the decision situation.
sistent and loose systems retain a sense of
identi ty across time, so that they can be 2. Unclear Technology. The organi-
recognized and dealt with in some formal zation manages to survive, yet its
manner. processes are not understood by its
members. It operates more on
A concept that attempts, at least in part, tr ial and error procedures and
to answer the intriguing question of under- learning from past mistakes.
standing consistency amid chaos is that of
loose coupling. Loose coupling suggests 3. Fluid Participation. Participants
that most organizations or systems can be vary in the amount of time and
decomposed into stable subassemblies that effort they devote to different
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domains; their involvement varies sion settings. It is recognized that current
from one time to another. The normative theories have a significant in-
boundaries of the organization, fluence on the procession of the lower and
therefore, are poorly defined and middle levels (or subassemblies) of an or-
constantly changing. ganization, but have had virtually no in-
fluence on the higher levels. In fact, by
These properties lead to several forms of applying normative techniques to a fun-
ambiguity concerning the decision context damentally ambiguous setting, the organ-
within the organization (March & Olsen, ization might actually bE pursuing "inap-
1976): propriate courses of action more effi-
ciently" (Mintzberg, Raisinhani, & Theor-
Ambiguity of Intention. Organi- et, 1976).
zations and even individuals have
inconsistent and ill-defined objec- When one studies the individual decision
tives. maker, it appears that the decision maker's
actions in complex settings could hold the
2. Ambiguity of Understanding. The key to understanding the decision process.
causal relationship among both in- Individual decision makers deal with com-
ternal and external events is un- plex, unstructured problems by breaking
certain. them down into more familiar, unstruc-
tured settings (Mintzberg, Raisinhani, &
3. Ambiguity of History. Past events Theoret, 1976; Payne, 1976). Use of prob-
are important, but they are not lem solving shortcuts such as satisficing is
easi ly interpreted. What appeared also in evidence. Mintzberg and his asso-
to happen may not really have ciates (1976), through a four year study of
happened; what really happened twenty-five decision processes, have been
may not have been intended. The able to subdivide the twenty-five processes
flow of individual actions produces into seven distinct groups. 0 f these seven
a flow of decisions that is intended groups, four have been found to involve
by no one and is not related in a similar outcomes.
direct way to anyone's desired
outcomes (March & Olsen, 1976). The implication is that, with an appropri-
ate representation, it might be possible to
4. Ambiguity of Attention. At any develop theories to model the ambiguities
point, individuals vary in the at- of complex organizations. The next sec-
tention that they give to various tion outlines the initial development of
decisions. Participation in these such a representation scheme.
decisions is fluid and continously
changing.
TASK REPRESENTATION USING
These forms of ambiguity indicate that a ASSOCIATIVE NETWORKS
revised theory of management is required
in which goals are unclear, and standard The previous section described the ambigu-
procedures are not applicable (March & ity of organizational activity with which
Olsen, 1976). Mintzberg ( 1973; Mintzberg, the manager must cope. Needed is a
Raisinhani & Theoret, 1976) has begun to representation technique that captures the
address the problem of identification of essential aspects of this environment. This
the manager's role in an organization in an section suggests a simple representation
attempt to develop a normative theory for for organizational activity based on asso-
management action in unstructured deci- ciative networks.
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The use of graph based structures to asso- aspects increases the modu lar ity of the
ciate factual information was first intro- representation.
duced by Ross Quillian (1968, 1969) in his
Ph.D. dissertation. Since then, many re- The first representation level (i.e., 1-level)
searchers have adopted similar techniques relates to the implementation aspects,for knowledge representation (KR). See such as the definition of the nodes andWoods ( 1975), Brachman ( 1979), and Mylo- edges of the directed graph formalism.
poulos ( 1981 ), for a review of previous
research with associative networks (AN). The second level (i.e., L-level) relates to
Note that the term "semantic networks" is the logical aspects, such as assertions of
not used since it refers to the "representa- relations between two objects. The defi-tion for linguistic utterances to capture nition of assertions uses the terminology ofthe underlying relations to words and to nodes and edges of the previous level.
produce information from text" (Brachman,
1979). Hence, semantic networks have a The third level (i.e., E-level) relates to the
narrower scope than associative networks. epistemological aspects. This level is
usually missing in many AN representations
For the purposes of exploring alternative (Brachman, 1979) and is the subject ofrepresentations for tasks, a simple repre- current KR research. For example, the
sentation using associative networks was epistemological level deals with the dis-
formulated and is called SAN for "Simple tinction between object types and in-Associative Network." SAN is a composite stances and generalization hierarchies ofof the Procedural Semantic Network (PSN) object types.
of Levesque and Mylopoulos ( 1979) and
KLONE of Brachman (1977). Further, the The fourth and final level (i.e., C-level) isaggregation relation is handled in SAN in a called the conceptual level and deals withway similar to the notion of frames (Min- the knowledge specific to the problem
sky, 1975; Bobrow & Winograd, 1976,1977, context. In the case of task representa-1979). A frame is a structured collection tions, the conceptual level will define anof properties (i.e., slots) that surround an object called task along with its structural
object, giving it the ability to represent properties. Also, a control structure will
complex situations in a compact manner. be defined over a set of task types using
Many of the advanced, and more interest- relations with the object type condition.
ing, features of these AN representations
are, however, not incorporated into SAN so
that the complexity of SAN could be min- Implementation Level of SAN
im ized for the purposes of task represen-
tation. The primitive concepts of SAN representa-
tion are based on a directed graph consist-
ing of nodes interconnected with edges.
The node having an edge "going out of it" is
Representation Levels called the out-node for that edge. Similar-
ly, the node having an edge "going into it"The following sections will discuss the SAN is called the in-node for that edge. The
representation in terms of "representation triple of (out-node, edge, in-node) is called
levels" that are built successively upon one a link. Consider the following link:
another (Brachman, 1979). The intention is
that the concepts and terminology of one A X Blevel are used as the primitive units of the
next level. This partitioning of the SAN .----- ---1.
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The nodes are labeled "A" and "B" respec- main object, while the in-node represents
tively and the edge is labeled "X." Labels the range obiect. For example, consider
on nodes and edges refer uniquely to to- the assertion "John is a student." This
kens. The purpose of tokens is to allow assert ion at the L-level can be represented
nodes and/or edges with the same labels to at the 1-level by the link:
be considered equivalent. Moreover, the John is instance of student
sarne token can be used as both a node and
an edge. For example, consider the token f- --1.
"X" in the following two links:
A X B We will adopt the following notation to
indicate that a link represents an assertion:
(John; is instance of; student)
Y C Note that the semicolon is a reserve sym-
bol that separates the relation token from
the two object tokens.
The implementation level of SAN can be For a good discussion of the correspon-
summarized using the Relational Data dence of predicate calculus to associative
Model of Codd ( 1970). A SAN "database" networks, see Nilsson ( 1980) where he dis-
consists of tuples for the relation LINK cusses "structured object representations."
having the form: Ni Isson also suggests the extension of the
L-level to first order predicate calculus by
LINK (OUT-NODE, EDGE, IN-NODE) the addition of connectives (e.g., conjunc-
tion, disjunction, implication, and negation)
where all three attributes act as the pri- and of universal and existential quantifi-
mary key and have the same domain of cation. The extension wi I I not be pursued
TOKEN. Note that in the relation LINK all in this paper since it is not yet needed for
tuples must be unique, implying that there the purposes of task representation.
do not exist identical edges between any
two nodes.
Epistemological Level of SAN
Logical Level of SAN The next level in the SAN representation is
called the epistemological level or E-level.
The next level up from the Implementation Woods ( 1975) and Brachman ( 1979) criticize
Level is called the Logical Level, or simply most KR research as having vague notions
the L-level. The L-level gives to tokens of their epistemological aspects. He ar-
and I inks an interpretation equivalent to gues for the "formal definition of knowl-
predicate calculus. Hence, the link acts as edge-structuring primitives" as opposed to
a binary relation that con be used to build the individual pieces of knowledge values
an arbitrary complex network of asser- (e.g., "John is a student").
tions.
More precisely, a link at the 1-level repre- Distinction Between Obiect
sents an assertion at the L-level consisting Instances and Object Types
of a relation (corresponding to the edge)
and two objects (corresponding to the The first aspect of the SAN epistemologi-
nodes). The out-node represents the do- cal level is the distinction between object
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types and object instances. An obiect type object instance to its componentsis a set or category of objects, such as (e.9., John has brown hair). An
"person." The object "person" does not aggregation assertion is indicated
actually exist in reality; however, what in SAN as follows: The link abovedoes exist are instances of "person," such asserts that "person" has a proper-as John, Mary, and Joe. Hence, an obiect ty attribute of "has hair color of"
instance is an actual object in reality, through the special token "is partwhile an object type is a classification of a of." A second link below assertscollection of equivalent object instances. that an object instance of "person"This distinction is usually clear for tangible (i.e., John) has a particular prop-
objects. There is, however, a significant erty value of that attribute,degree of ambiguity when dealing with namely brown hair.events and concepts.
(has hair color of; is part of; person)The convention is followed using upper
case letters for labels of gener ic object The link above asserts that "person" has atypes and using lower case letters for ob- property attribute of "has hair color of"
ject instances and problem-specific object through the special token "is part of." A
types. second I ink below asserts that an object
instance of "person" (i.e., John) has a par-
ticular property value of that attribute,Abstraction Assertions namely brown hair.
The E-level of SAN consists of three ab- (John; has hair color of; brown)
straction assertions:
A mild consensus is developing among the
1. Classification. An assertion is said KR researchers that the above three ab-to be a classification if a specified straction assertions are "primitive" (My-
object token (e.g., John) is a lopoulos, 1980). Also note that Smith &
member of an object type (e.g., Smith (1977) define aggregation and gen-
"student"). A classification asser- eralization along similar lines.
tion is indicated in 5AN by using
the special token "is instance of" We will adopt the notion that the verb "is"
as an edge: is reserved for these three abstraction as-
sertions, whi le the verb "has" is used to
(John; is instance of; student) form property attributes of the aggrega-
tion assertion. Hence, the verb "is" is
2. Generalization. An assertion is more primitive and focused on the E-level,said to be a generalization if it while the verb "has" is an important build-
relates one object type (e.g., "stu- ing tool for the C-level.
dent") as a subset of another object
type (e.g., "person"). A genera 1- Between the classification and generaliza-
ization assertion is indicated, using tion assertions, a hierarchy of object typesthe special token "is type of" as an can be formed. The object types higher in
edge, as follows: the hierarchy are generalizations of those
lower. Conversely, the object types lower(student; is type of; person) in the hierarchy are specializations of
those higher. Hence, one can say that an
3. Aggregation. An assertion is said to object type is special ized into lower level
be an aggregation if it relates an object types.
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Inheritance of Properties student, as they may be radically different.
In some cases, however, values wi 11 be
In the example above, note that John inherited (particularly for default values).
(which is an instance of student) inherited When this occurs, the inheritance of a
the property attribute of "has hair color value always presupposes the inheritance
of" from the object type "person." This of the associated property attribute.
inheritance propagates through two levels
of the abstraction hierarchy. Property Definition of CLASS, RELATION,
inheritance is an important feature in and VALUE
many AN representations.
All objects (i.e., types and instances) are
At this stage of the SAN representation, related together through a generalization
the mechanisms for property inheritance hierarchy to the object type OBJECT (as
are not fully defined. We can, however, suggested by Levesque & Mylopoulos, 1979).
supply a few general properties of inheri- OBJECT is then specialized into CLASS,
tance. RELATION, and VALUE through the as-
sertions:
When an object is an instance of more than
one class, it will inherit attributes from all ( CLASS; is type of; OBJECT)
the classes. In particular, when a class is a
subclass of another class (i.e., student is a (RELATION; is type of; OBJECT)
subclass of person) an object which is an
instance of the subclass (i.e., John), will (VALUE; is type of; OBJECT)
inherit attributes of both classes.
OBJECT is also given a special property
Inheritance of attributes is a convenient attribute "has default of" that will be used
way to extend and refine existing classes, later to given object instances a default
because of the cumulative nature of inheri- property value if none is specified for that
tance. It is in precisely this manner that instance:
inheritance serves as an abstraction
mechanism, since objects are defined by (has default of; is part of; OBJECT)
showing how they differ from existing,
more general objects. Details concerning CLASS can be further specialized into ob-
the simi larities between objects are sup- ject types appropriate to the problem con-
pressed (as shown by Levesque & Mylo- text. As explained in the section entitled
poulos, 1979). "Conceptual Level of SAN," CLASS wi 11 be
specialized into person, task, and condi-
We will also separate inheritance of pro- tion.
perty attributes from inheritance of spe-
cific values for those attributes. For ex- RELATION is specializd into ASSERTION
ample: and PROPERTY as follows:
(average IQ; is part of; person) (ASSERTION; is type of; RELATION)
(student; is type of; person) (PROPERTY; is type of; RELATION)
The class student will inherit the property PROPERTY differs from ASSERTION in
attribute of average IQ, yet the value that PROPERTY gives "structure" to an
assigned to the attribute for the class object type by attaching PROPERTY attr i-
person will not be inherited by the class bute to that object type. The implication
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is that instances of that object type should The domain of a property attribute is un-
have (in the normal situation) associated derstood to be the specified object type in
property values for each property attri- the "is part of" assertion.
bute. An example of the property attri-
bute "has hair color of" was given in a The VALUE object type can be specialized,
previous section. On the other hand, as needed, into categories appropriate for
ASSERTION specifies a relation between the property values of the problem con-
object types in general, rather than some text. For example, the specification of the
structural component of a particular object "state" of a condition has the range of
type. TRUTH VALUE, that is defined as follows:
The only instance of the PROPERTY ob- (TRUTH VALUE; is type of; VALUE)
ject type is Jlis part of" corresponding to
the aggregation relation: ' (true; is instance of; TRUTH VALUE)
(is part of; is instance of; PROPERTY) (false; is instance of; TRUTH VALUE)
On the other hand, ASSERTION has two To summarize tbe discussion of the E-
instances, corresponding to the classifi- level, Figure I shows the generalization
cation and generalization relations respec- hierarchy of OBJECT, etc. The boxes
tively: indicate object types, while the circles
indicate object instances. The double ar-
(is instance of; is instance of; ASSERTION) rows indicate the "is type of" assertion
(i.e., generalization) and the single arrows
(is type of; is instance of; ASSERTION) indicate the "is instance of" assertion (i.e.,
classification). The E-level is composed of
To explicitly differentiate ASSERTION and the objects above the dashed line, while
PROPERTY object types, each are given the C-level (to be discussed in the next
differing property attributes. ASSERTION section) is below the line. The intent is
object type has the property attributes of that the objects within the E-level are
domain and range: relatively independent of particular prob-
lem contexts or situations, in contrast to
(has domain of; is part of; ASSERTION) the C-level whose function is to model the
problem context.
(has range of; is part of; ASSERTION)
along with the general default of CLASS
for both domain and range: Conceptual Level of SAN
(has domain of; has default of; CLASS) The final representation level for SAN fo-
cuses on the knowledge aspects that are
(has range of; has default of; CLASS) specific to tsk representations. As men-
tioned before, CLASS is specialized into
The PROPERTY object type has only a person, task, and condition:
"value" property attribute with a default of
VALUE: (person; is type of; CLASS)
(has value type of; is part of; PROPERTY). (task; is type of; CLASS)















task \ ASSERTION PROPERTY VALUEFred
a nswer is is is falseture-phone \ instance type part
C-LEVEL of of of
\(problem
dependent) \
Figure 1. Generalization Hierarchy
The object type "person" is self-evident; The second task could be considered a
the next sections will explain the defini- specialization of the first:
tions of the "task" and "condition" object
types. (market product; is type of; task)
(send literature; is type of;
Definition of Task market product)
Three aspects are explained relative to Finally, the nature of task instances needs
task definition: (a) property attributes of to be specified. The approach used in this
task, (b) task specialization into means/ paper is to define a new assertion "is
goals hierarchy, and (c) the nature of task occurrence of" to distinguish task types
instances. from task instances:
First, the property attributes of task were (is occurrence of; is instance of;
chosen to be: time, actor, and pre-con- ASSERTION)
ditions:
For example, consider the task "answer
(has time of; is part of; task) phone" and an occurrence of it:
(has actor of; is part of; task) (answer phone; is type of; market product)
(has condition of; is part of; task) (*01; is occurrence of; answer phone)
The value types for these attr ibutes are: (*01; has time of; 12:34 3/13/81)
(has time of; has value type of; (*01; has actor of; Fred)
TIME VALUE)
Note that a task occurrence (and most
(has actor of; has value type of; person) object instances for that matter) is re-
ferred to by an indefinite label, implying
(has condition of; has value type of; that the occurrence is denoted in conver-
condition) sation by its context (e.g., "the phone call
that Fred had thirty m inutes ago").
Secondly, task can be specialized into
lower level task types, such as "answer
phone" or "send literature." Through this Definition of Condition
specialization, a means/goal hierarchy can
be constructed. The specialization of a For the purpose of interrelating tasks in
task type can be said to be the means of terms of a "control structure," the concept
that task type. Conversely, the generali- of object type "condition" is introduced
zation of a task type can be said to be the into the task representation. The property
goal of that task type. After Ossorio attributes of a condition involve the con-
11978), higher level task types can be dition state and the activation of that
viewed as "how do you do that?" The condition:
means versus goal distinction introduces
the notion of purposefulness into the con- (has value of; is part of; condition)
cept of task (Ackoff & Emery, 1972; Simon,
1969). For example, consider the two tasks (has state of; has value type of;
"market product" and "send literature." TRUl H VALUE)
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(has state of; has default of; false) tivation of" is the directed arc connecting
a task (source) to a condition (sink). A task
(has activation of; is part of; condition) occurs (i.e., is enabled and fired) when all
the necessary conditions for the task have
(has activation of; has value type of; task) the state of "true."
Note that the condition state is initially As an example, consider the process of
set to "false" and that the activation of a making a sale. First, there must be pro-
condition depends-· upon the occurrence of a duct awareness on the part of a consumer:
task.
(send literature; has condition of;
person isinterested)
Task Control Structure
Through the use of the property attributes When the following assertion is true:
"has condition of" and "has activation of" (person is interested; has state of; true)for tasks and conditions, respectively, a
control structure can be constructed that
is equivalent to Petri Nets (Holt, 1971; Then the task "send literature" occurs, and
Horning & Randell, 1973; Peterson, 1977). product awareness results:
Petri Nets is a digraph formalism that has
extensive mathematical treatment that (person is aware of product; has acti-
incorporates two complementary ways of vation of; send literature)
viewing a process: as a sequence of oper-
ations; or as a sequence of states. Product awareness is the condition for
making a sales pitch:
There have been recent extensions of the
Petri Nef formalism. First, Hackathorn (make sales pitch; has condition of;
(1976, 1977a) and Meldman & Holt (1971) person is aware of product)
have used this formalism as a descriptive
modeling technique. Secondly, Zisman and the assertion:
(1977) used Petri Nets augmented with re-
cursive nets and production rules (Newell & (person is aware of product;
Simon, 1972) to define a specification lan- has state of; true)
guage for office procedures. Finally, work
on Information Control Nets (ICN) of Ellis will cause the activation of the task "make
(1979), Ellis and Nutt (1980), and Cook sales pitch." The occurrence of this task
(1980) has further extended the Petri Nets will result in the sales decision:
formalism to include explicitly both con-
trol and information flows. A graphical (sales decision; has activation of;
technique has been refined to illustrate make sales pitch)
ICN's as descriptions of office processes.
This condition enables either one of the
In our notation, a task type is equivalent to following two tasks to occur:
the Petri Nets notation of transition, and a
condition for a task is equivalent to the (take order; has condition of;
notion of place. The property attribute sales decision)
"has condition of" is the directed arc con-
necting a condition (source) to a task (terminate contact; has condition
(sink), and the property attribute "has ac- of; sales decision)
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depending on the state of the decision. "(*01; is instance of; answer phone)" and
This type of control structure allows for "(John; is instance of; student)." Whatever
the richness of conflict and resolution in- distinguishes these assertions should beherent in the Petri Nets formalism. The handled as property attributes, such as "hascomplete diagram is shown in Figure 2. time of" as an attribute of task. Secondly,
create a new object type cal led "event"
and remove any connotation of time fromCONCEPTUAL ISSUES OF the task object type. The object typeTASK REPRESENTATION "event" could then have the property attri-
bute:
The current stage of using the SAN for-
malism for task representation has only (has occurrence of; is part of; event)dealt with simple notions of tasks, con-
ditions, and persons. Even at this prelim- (has occurrence of; has value type of; task)inary stage, several fundamental issues of
conceptualizing task representations have
surfaced: Specialization of Task Types into
Means/Goal Hierarchy• Instances versus occurrences of
tasks From the organizational behavior litera-
ture discussed in the third section, it is• Specialization of task types into apparent that specializing tasks into meansmeans/goal and goals is a gross simplification. The
quest ion is whether the means/goal hier-• Multiple task types for a single task archy is a useful simplification that can beoccurrence extended in later work. In this paper, the
means/goal hierarchy is used to focus at-• Relation of control structure to task tention on the following aspects:
occurrence
a) Purposeful direction of action,
Instances Versus Occurrences of Tasks b) Mechanism for creating task hier-
archies (Sacerdoti, 1977; Pearl, Leal,
Saleh, 1981), andAs mentioned in the definition of the
"task" object type, a new assertion "is c) Goal definition as justification of
occurrence of" was defined to distinguish past actions, rather than direction
task types from task instances. The prob- of future action.
lem with this approach is that it creates a
new assertion type with little epistemo-
logical basis for doing so. The argument is Multiple Task Types for a
that a task instance denotes the occur- Task Type of Occurrencerence of an event that occupies a singular
point along some time dimension. This Expanding on the means/goal hierarchy,distinction is somehow fundamentally dif- consider the following example of a taskferent than (John; is instance of; student). occurence:
There are two other alternatives for the
"occurrence/instance" problem. First, just (*02; is occurrence of; make phone call)
consider a task instance as a task instance.
That is, there is no difference between (*02; is occurrence of; make sales pitch)
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person is interested
1 , send literature
person is aware of product
, make sales pitch
person is deciding on purchase
terminate , -- , make sale
contact  
Figure 2. Petri Net Of Sales Contact
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(*02; has time of; 15:20 3/20/81) in a system, each of which has events that
relate solely to the particular entity.
(*02; has actor of; Fred) These events can occur independently
without the need for synchronization. If,
(*02; has object of; John) however, synchronization is necessary, this
situation is also easily modeled. Non-
In this example, Fred makes a phone call to determinism deals with the fact that in a
John for the purpose of selling some prod- Petri Net composed of a sequence of dis-
uct to John. Note that "*02" is the occur- crete events, the order of occurrence of
rence of two task types, one is a "means" events is one of many allowable sequences.
type (i.e., make phone call) and the other is If more than one task can occur at any
a "goa'" type (i.e., make sales pitch). The time, then any of these tasks may occur.
situation can easily become more complex The choice of which task will occur is
with multiple means for the same goal or made in a non-deterministic manner (i.e.,
multiple goals for the same means. If the randomly or by factors that are not mod-
ambiguity that was mentioned by Weick eled). This feature reflects realistic situ-
(1969), Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972), and ations where, when several things are
March and Olsen (1976) is credible, then the happening concurrently, the order of oc-
connection of means and goals within task currence is not unique.
occurrence wi I I be even more nebulous.
Severa I approaches to exploring this rela-
This problem with multiple object types for tion can be adopted:
an object instance is well known to KR
researchers. If an object instance (or type) a) Simulation of control structure to
has multiple object types as its generali- produce occurrence behavior,
zation, then the rules for property inheri-
tance are ambiguous. This situation is no b) Analysis of occurrence behavior to
longer a generalization hierarchy, but a infer control structure, and
lattice formed from the partial ordering of
"is type of" and "is instance of" assertions. c) Consistency of control structure to
occurrence behavior.
Relation of Control Structure to
Task Occurrences
As described in the section on task control CONCLUSIONS
structure, the property attributes "has
condition of" and "has activation of" form This paper has formalized an initial repre-
a control structure that is equivalent to sentation for task based on recent work
that of Petri Nets. The issue then arises as with associative networks. The first part
to what is the relation between the task discussed the nature of decision support
control structure and task occurrences. and, in particular, the inherent dilemma
faced by a manager. The next section
Some attributes of Petri Nets are particu- elaborated on the ambiguity of organi-
larly useful in modeling complex systems zational activity. The fourth section ex-
such as organizations. In particular, the · plained the SAN representation and its use
feature of concurrency and non-determin- for task representation. The fifth section
ism provide extreme flexibility (Peterson, explored several of the conceptual issues
1977). Concurrency handles the notion of that surfaced from the SAN representation
two or more kinds of independent entities when used for task representations.
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The contributions of this paper are: Konsynski, 1981; Tsichritzis, 1980;
Zisman, 1977);
a) An initial task representation built
on primitive concepts, • Networks of commitments (Flores &
Ludlow, 1980; Searle, 1969); promises
b) Equivalence to Petri Nets for (Lee, 1980), or mental images (Bar-
process coordination aspects, barie, 1981) among persons;
c) Discussion of task instances versus • Belief versus Knowledge Systems
occurrences, (Abelson, 1973,1979).
d) Specialization of task types into Finally, a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981)
means/goal hierarchy, listed the uses for a task representation:
e) Discussion of multiple task types a) Description. A descriptive state-
per occurrence, and ment of how tasks have been per-
formed, such as in a case study.
f) Relation of task control structure
to occurrence behavior. b) Specification. A normative state-
ment of how the tasks should be
The issues raised by this paper are funda- performed, such as in a system
mental for evolving a practical representa- design.
tion for tasks within a decision support
framework. These issues are not artifacts c) Analysis. Inspection of the task
of the SAN representation, but are funda- description according to specified
mental to the nature of organizational ac'- criteria for consistency, non-re-
iii vity. dundency, etc.
A future step is to integrate the concepts d) Optimization. The permutation of
and issues of the SAN representation with a task description so that certain
related (but diverse) research, such as: criteria are maximized.
• Model Management Systems (Elam, e) Maintenance. The revision of a
Henderson, & Miller, 1980; Elam & task description based on changes
Henderson, 1981; Konsynski, 1981); in task activity.
• Process Descriptions (Ossorio, 1978; f) Prediction. Simulation of a task
Jeffrey & Putnam, 1980; description into future time peri-
ods.
• Information Control Networks (ICN)
(Ellis, 1979; Ellis & Nutt, 1980; Cook, The most important use is the first. At the
1980); heart of understanding ambiguous activi-ties within organizations is the ability to
• Planning systems (Sacerdoti, 1977; describe accurately individual events, 0-
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; long with general patterns. The imposing
Schank & Abelson, 1977; Stefik, of organizationally sanctioned activities
1980); should be analyzed in the same conceptualcontext as those activities that emerged
• Office Specification Languages from recurring patterns. Therefore, the
(Hammer & Kunin, 1980; Nawojski & greatest research problem in decision sup-
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APPENDIX A. SIMPLE ASSOCIATIVE NETWORK EDITOR (SANE)
In the early stages of this work, it became clear that manual manipulation of any non-
trivial AN was infeasible. Since the intent was to explore the implications of AN
representations of tasks, a tool was constructed whose primary function was editing these
networks. The editor for SAN, called SANE, was developed using the Micro-SEED
CODASYL database management system (Micro Decisionware, 1981). The SANE program
operates on 8080/Z80 microcomputers under the CP/M operating system. Given the
limitations of 50OK bytes for floppy disk storage, AN databases composed of 20,000 tokens
and links can be reasonably manipulated. The interaction with SANE is in the tradition of
LISP editors, with cursor control to the CRT terminal.






The two record types TOKEN and LINK are related through three set types 0, E, and I that
are the roles of out-node, edge, and in-node, respectively. The only data item is LABEL in
the TOKEN record type.
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APPENDIX B. LISTING OF ASSERTIONS
CLASS is type of OBJECT
RELATION is type of OBJECT
VALUE is type of OBJECT
has default of is part of OBJECT
ASSERTION is type of RELATION
PROPERTY is type of RELATION
is part of is instance of PROPERTY
is instance of is instance of ASSERTION
is type of is instance of ASSERTION
has domain of is part of ASSERTION
has range of is part of ASSERTION
has domain of has default of CLASS
has range of has default of CLASS
has value type of is part of PROPERTY
has value type of has default of VALUE
TRUTH VALUE is type of VALUE
true is instance of TRUTH VALUE
false is instance of TRUTH VALUE
person is type of CLASS
task is type of CLASS
condition is type of CLASS
has time of is part of task
has actor of is part of task
has condition of is part of task
has time of has value type of TIME VALUE
has actor of has value type of person
has condition of has value type of condition
is occurrence of isinstance of ASSERTION
has state of is part of condition
has state of has range of TRUTH VALUE
has state of has default of false
has activation of is part of condition
has activation of has value type of task
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